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BLACK RAGE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A PRINCIPLED
APPROACH TO A POLARIZED DEBATE
JUDD F. SNEIRSONt
INTRODUCTION
Tragedy struck the Long Island Railroad on December 7, 1993,
as the 5:33 to Hicksville left the New York City limits.' Method-
ically, as if collecting train tickets, Colin Ferguson passed down
the aisle of the third car of the train, steadily shooting to his right
and then to his left, until he emptied two fifteen-bullet clips into
twenty-five defenseless Long Island commuters.2 Handwritten
notes in Ferguson's pockets explained his actions as a venting of the
rage he-a black man-felt toward "everyone from Gov[ernor] Mario
M. Cuomo to the state Workers' Compensation Board to Asians,
whites, and 'Uncle Tom Negroes.'" 3 Months later, the racial stress,
anxiety, and anger evidenced in these notes would provide the
foundation for Ferguson's legal defense: a new twist on the
traditional insanity defense called the "black rage" defense.'
t B.A. 1992, Williams College;J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Pennsylvania.
I would like to thank Risa Cherry, Scott Goldberg, Katherine Kelly, Marc Kesselman,
Kimberly Kessler, Craig Lehner, Michael Manasse, and Michael Raibman for their
thoughtful suggestions on earlier drafts; my Law Review colleagues for their careful
editing; and Elisa Duncan and my parents for their love and support.
I dedicate this Comment to the memory of Al Bennett, whose English lessons
and life lessons inspire well after high school.
I SeeJames Barron, Portrait of Suspect Emerges in Shooting on LL Train: Notes Found
on Man Speak of His Hatred, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at Al, B8 (detailing the
situation on the Hicksville train).
2 See Francis X. Clines, Gunman in a Train Passes Out Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1993, at Al. Six died and nineteen were wounded in the shooting spree. See Rorie
Sherman, 'Black Rage' Rises Again as Defense, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 25, 1994, at A6
(describing the aftermath of Ferguson's rampage); see also Peter Marks, 5 Evetyday
People by Chance or Ritua4 Riding in Car No. 3, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at Al, B9
(describing the victims of the shooting spree).
3 Barron, supra note 1, at Al; see also Excerpts from Papers and Letter of Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at B8 [hereinafter Papers and Letter of Suspect] (excerpting some
of Ferguson's personal papers); Charisse Jones, In Notes and Past of Accused, Portrait
of Boiling Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at B8 (detailing Ferguson's hatred of
whites).
4 See, e.g., Michael Alexander, Black Rage, NEwsDAY (N.Y.), May 9, 1994, at B4
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According to Ferguson's former defense attorneys,' American
society's pervasive and destructive racism gradually kindled and
fueled a smoldering rage that operated as a catalyst to push their
already mentally unstable client over the edge into insanity. 6 This
seemingly novel argument is not without legal or psychiatric
precedent. In 1846, a New York appellate court embraced a similar
argument, finding a man insane as a result of the brutality he
suffered as a black man in upstate New York." The seminal
sociological and psychiatric study Black Rage also propounds this
argument, devoting an entire chapter to mental conditions arising
from the constant racial stress many black Americans experience.
8
Drawing upon these and other sources, Ferguson's attorneys
(discussing black rage and the black rage defense). The term "black rage" originates
from the sociological and psychological study that first depicted the condition. See
generally WILLIAM H. CRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968) (providing the
first examination of black rage).
' Criminal defense attorneys William M. Kunstler and Ronald L. Kuby represented
Ferguson at the height of the case's publicity. SeeJohn T. McQuiston, LLR.R. Trial
Has Adviser 'Disgusted', N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1995, at B5. Convinced that he was not
insane and did not perpetrate any crime, Ferguson resisted the planned black rage
insanity defense, fired Kunstler and Kuby, and represented himself. See Telephone
Interview with Ronald L. Kuby, Kunstler & Kuby (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Kuby
Telephone Interview].
On February 17, 1995, after 10 hours of deliberation, ajury rejected Ferguson's
mistaken identity defense and found him guilty of murder and of attempted murder.
SeeJohn T. McQuiston, Colin Ferguson Convicted of L.LR.R. Train Massacre: Smiles in
Courtroom as Verdict Is Read on the 93 Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at Al. On
March 22, 1995, a judge sentenced Ferguson to 200 years in prison. See John T.
McQuiston, Rail Gunman to Spend Life Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at BI
(noting that Ferguson received the maximum sentence). Ferguson plans to appeal.
See id.
6 See Attorney and Congressman Debate "Black Rage" Defense (CNN television
broadcast, Mar. 15, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (inter-
viewing William Kunster) [hereinafter CNN News]; see also Alexander, supra note 4,
at B4 (stating that Ferguson's former attorneys wanted to "persuade a jury that
Ferguson acted out of extreme racial stress ... when he killed six people and
wounded 19 others"); Sherman, supra note 2, at A6 (paraphrasing Kunstler as stating
that "American society's pervasive and destructive racism pushed a mentally unstable
Ferguson over the edge").
7 See Sherman, supra note 2, at A6 (describing the 1846 New York case). A jury
found the accused, William Freeman, sane and guilty of murdering four whites, but
the appellate court reversed and remanded on the grounds that the sanity hearing
had been improperly conducted. See id. Before a retrial, however, Freeman died of
tuberculosis and an autopsy revealed a brain disease. See id. The appellate court then
ruled Freeman insane as a result of brutalization by whites. See id.
8 See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 4, at 154-80 (focusing on mental illness and
treatment). Unlike Ferguson's former attorneys, Grier and Cobbs treat black rage as
a mental disease independent of an underlying mental condition. See id.
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intended to persuade the jury that their client should not be held
accountable for his actions on the ill-fated train car.
9
As might be expected, the prospect of a black rage defense has
drawn both criticism and praise. Many find the defense demeaning
to blacks, exhuming "ancient stereotypes of the 'crazy nigger,' child-
like primitive, straight out of D.W. Griffith's Birth of a Nation,
unable to control his hot-blooded tropical lusts."1" Indeed, depic-
tions of the black race as susceptible to uncontrollable rage and
prone to violence may inadvertently justify white fear of blacks and
thus further racist attitudes.' Although a majority of Americans
express a general distaste for attempts to excuse criminal conduct
by portraying the defendant as a victim, others find the black rage
defense "compelling." 2 They celebrate the defense as a political
legitimization of aggressive responses to racial oppression, noting
that the appropriate flip side to black rage is white guilt and fear."
In addition to touching upon highly political and sensitive issues
like race and crime, this widely publicized defense typifies an
increasingly popular trend in the criminal law whereby the perpetra-
tor of a crime depicts himself 4 as a victim in order to escape
criminal responsibility. 5 These victimization defenses-drawing
9 See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 2, at A6 (describing the trial tactics of Ferguson's
former attorneys).
10 Clarence Page, "Black Rage" May Be Real but No Rationale for Murder, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 23, 1994, at 43A; see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE
ExcUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 90
(1994) ("[T]he 'black rage' variation on the abuse-excuse defense is an insult to
millions of law-abiding black Americans.").
'n See DERSHOWrrz, supra note 10, at 90 ("[I]f blacks as a group have more 'rage'
than others, and are thus more inclined toward violence, some racists will argue for
longer sentences for black recidivists, earlier and harsher police intrusion against
black suspects, and other forms of 'preventive' intervention in black neighbor-
hoods."); Law & Order (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 1, 1995) ("[I]t's you who are
giving all the bigots in this country the justification for their fear and hatred.")
(statement of prosecutor to black rage expert witness).
2 Poll: Defendants as Victims No Defense, UPI, Apr. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Curnws File. Forty-five percent of whites and sixty-eight percent of
blacks surveyed reported that they were receptive to the black rage defense. See id.
1s See Eric Pooley, Capitalizing on a Killer: A Spurious "Black Rage" Defense,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 18, 1994, at 38 (attributing this position to civil rights activists
Al Sharpton, Vernon Mason, and Colin Moore). Some criticize the black rage defense
for this very same reason. See DERSHOWrTZ, supra note 10, at 27 (criticizing the black
rage defense as encouraging vigilante justice); Pooley, supra, at 38 (arguing that
Ferguson's attorneys and civil rights leaders have overly politicized and manipulated
the Ferguson case).
14 For clarity and consistency with the discussion of Ferguson, masculine generic
personal pronouns appear throughout this Comment.
5 See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 10, at 3 (criticizing the trend); Niko Price, The
1995] 2253
2254 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2251
upon a self-defense theory to justify criminal behavior 16 or drawing
upon an insanity theory to excuse criminal behavior' 7-range from
the widely accepted to the highly laughable and seem to accommo-
date any set of circumstances. 8  Consequently, victimization
defenses like the black rage defense have the dangerous potential
"Abuse Excuse.: Threat toJustice?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1994, at 3 (citing a
number of legal observers who are also critical of this trend).
" These defenses are known in criminal law as justifications. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 180 (1987) ("[Jlustified conduct is conduct
that under ordinary circumstances is criminal but which under the special circum-
stances that constitute the justification defense is not wrongful and, perhaps, is
even affirmatively desirable."); see also Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1095-96 (1985) (distinguishing between criminal law justifications
and excuses); infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing criminal law
justifications).
Self-defense theory exculpates the defendant who is not the aggressor and who
reasonably believes that his use of force is necessary to repel the imminent and
unlawful use of force by the aggressor. See DRESSLER, supra, at 191 (listing the
elements of the self-defense justification). Victimization justifications, such as the
battered person's syndrome raised by Lorena Bobbitt and the Menendez brothers, try
to extend self-defense theory by relaxing the requirement of imminent danger, see,
e.g., Rocco C. Cipparone,Jr., Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 427, 436-39 (1987) ("Imminence does not mean inevitability or
certainty .... "), and by injecting subjectivity into the requirement of reasonable
belief, see, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984) (admitting expert
testimony on the battered woman's syndrome that "could significantly affect the jury's
evaluation of the reasonableness of defendant's fear for her life"). For a discussion
of the battered woman's syndrome justification, see DRESSLER, supra, at 203-05 and
the sources cited therein.
" These defenses are known in the criminal law as excuses. See DRESSLER, supra
note 16, at 183 ("[E]xcused conduct is wrongful and unjustified conduct that causes
social harm but for which the actor is not held personally to blame."); see also Moore,
supra note 16, at 1097-99 (delineating the criminal law excuses); infra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text (discussing criminal law excuses).
Insanity exculpates the defendant whom the court finds to be seriously mentally
ill. Victimization excuses try to work a pattern of victimization into this framework,
claiming that a history of abuse has driven the defendant-victim legally insane.
Although these defenses generate more controversy than do the victimization
justifications, they have been subject to considerably less legal analysis. See, e.g., Maria
Massucci &James A. Pitaro, Note, Victimization as a Defense: Valid Protection for the
Innocent or Escapefrom Criminal Responsibility?, 8 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 305,
326-36 (1992) (discussing post-partum depression and acute grief syndrome).
" For a catalogue of victimization defenses, see DERSHOWITZ, supra note 10, at
321-41 (describing and assessing a litany of "abuse excuses," including Chronic
Lateness Syndrome, Football Widow Syndrome, and UFO Survivor Syndrome); see also
Price, supra note 15, at 3 (discussing the "urban survival syndrome" raised by an
inner-city Texas youth on trial for the hasty murder of two unarmed men); Margot
Slade, At the Bar In a Growing Number of Cases, Defendants Are Portraying Themselves
as the Victims, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B20 (discussing the meek-mate defense
successfully raised in a California case by a psychologically emasculated husband on
trial for the murder of his wife).
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to "weaken traditional beliefs about personal responsibility, increase
lawlessness by creating a license for vigilante violence, and 'under-
cut the credibility of legitimate defenses in appropriate cases. ' "19
This Comment analyzes how black rage fits into the existing
criminal law and suggests that its introduction produces a troubling
result. Part I discusses the psychiatric and sociological underpin-
nings of black rage and explores possible roles for a black rage
defense in the criminal law. Part II argues that the black rage
defense fits neatly into the family of insanity defenses, applies the
requirements of the several insanity tests to black rage, and
compares black rage to similar mental conditions that commonly
pass these tests. Part II then argues that black rage also fits into a
diminished capacity role, meeting the requirements of the Model
Penal Code test for mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Part III analyzes these results under both utilitarian and retributivist
lenses, suggesting that black rage differs from legally recognized
varieties of insanity in important respects. Part III then balances
the competing interests of the two penal theories and proposes an
acceptable solution.
I. BLACK RAGE AND THE BLACK RAGE DEFENSE
20
A. The Psychiatric and Sociological Basis for Black Rage
Black rage describes a mental disturbance caused by long-term
exposure to societal racism. Psychiatrists William H. Grier and
Price M. Cobbs first formally advanced the notion of a mental
condition defined by black rage in 1968.21 Grier and Cobbs wrote
9James Andrews, I May Be a Murderer, but It's Not My Fault, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Sept. 19, 1994, at 13, 13 (quoting Alan Dershowitz); see also DERSHowrrz,
supra note 10, at 27-29 (expressing his concerns as a civil libertarian, defense lawyer,
and egalitarian).
20 Ferguson's attorneys had hoped to argue that Ferguson's black rage merely
exacerbated a pre-existing mental condition. See Pooley, supra note 13, at 38 (quoting
William Kunstler, one of Ferguson's former defense attorneys, as assuring whites that
"Ferguson's rage was simply a catalyst for violence resulting from a pre-existing men-
tal illness"); CNN News, supra note 6 ("[T]his kind of rage can trigger off a mentally
ill person, even to kill." (quoting Kunstler)); Kuby Telephone Interview, supra note
5 (opining that, as a practical matter, it would be "impossible to imagine" a jury
accepting black rage as a stand-alone illness). Thus, Ferguson's planned insanity
defense differed from the stand-alone black rage defense on which this Comment
focuses. But see DERSHOWITZ, supra note 10, at 90 (seeing little difference between
rage producing violent crime by itself and rage acting as a catalyst for violent crime).
21 See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 4, at 200-13.
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that blacks in America must develop a "'healthy' cultural paranoia"
as a coping mechanism to deal with constant racial stress:
[I]t is necessary for a black man in America to develop a profound
distrust of his white fellow citizens and of the nation.... If he
does not so protect himself, he will live a life of such pain and
shock as to find life itself unbearable. For his own survival, then,
he must develop a cultural paranoia in which every white man is a
potential enemy unless proved otherwise and every social system
is set against him unless he personally finds out differently.22
In coping with this racial stress, blacks must continually endure
subtle racism such as being passed up by cabs or being taken as
shoplifters in stores.2" These subtle insults send a recurring
message that blacks are inferior, fueling a resentment within the
black psyche that can cause depression, grief, and rage.24 Conse-
quently, Grier and Cobbs foretold, "As a sapling bent low stores
energy for a violent backswing, blacks bent double by oppression
have stored energy which will be released in the form of rage-black
rage, apocalyptic and final."
25
Id. at 177-78; see also Sylvia Adcock, "Black Rage" Strategy: New Insanity Defense
in LIRR Massacre, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 15,1994, at 7 (synopsizing Grier and Cobbs's
black rage theory).
" See Alexander, supra note 4, at B4 (calling these day-to-day examples of discrimi-
nation "micro insults"); see also Ellis Cose, I Have This Rage, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,
Nov. 28, 1993, at F1 (making a black rage argument before the L.I.R.R. massacre
occurred).
24 See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 4, at 209-10 (detailing the sources and implica-
tions of black rage); Alexander, supra note 4, at B4 (same); Alvin F. Poussaint, Black-
on-Black Homicide: A Psychological-Political Perspective, 8 VICTIMOLOGY 161, 163 (1983)
("[I]nstitutional racism... fosters a chronic lack of Black self-respect, predisposing
many poor Blacks to behave self-destructively and with uncontrollable rage."); Law
&' Order, supra note 11 ("A lifetime of suffering the indignities of a racist society;
eventually the kettle boils over... the experts call it 'black rage.'"); see also Richard
Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of
Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 9, 35 (1985) (noting that
"[h]umans subjected to stress and danger become irritable and aggressive" and citing
studies to this effect).
2 GRIER & COBBS, supra note 4, at 210; see also Law & Order, supra note 11
("Eventually [a black man's self-hatred] is redirected outward toward [his] tormentors.
Some individuals can't help but lash out at the symbols of their torment.").
More recently, psychiatrists have taken a less violent and less dramatic view:
"Most blacks take a healthy point of view on dealing with discrimination and racism
... tak[ing] their anger and rage and us[ing] it constructively, working harder in ajob
or using it as an incentive to acquire better skills in a particular area." Alexander,
supra note 4, at B4 (quoting Alvin F. Poussaint, Associate Professor of Psychiatry at
Harvard University); see also JAMES P. COMER & ALVIN F. PoussAINT, BLACK CHILD
CARE: How TO BRING UP A HEALTHY BLACK CHILD IN AMERICA 64 (1975)
(suggesting that parents channel "early negative behavior, anger, and aggression" into
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Unlike the America that causes black rage, the black rage
phenomenon does not discriminate by class. Indeed, well-to-do
blacks are not immune from black rage: they may continue to
harbor "deep-seated anger, frustration, and isolation... despite...
outward trappings of success."26 In addition to the stress of
constant discrimination, successful blacks may face corporate glass
ceilings designed to prevent black promotions; "continued exclusion
from the old-boy network[s];... problems coping with [their] own
cultural and racial identity; ... [and] the realization that the next
generation of blacks will probably have to deal with the same issues
of racism and exclusion from society."27 These additional stressors
operate to fuel further the class-blind condition called black rage.
This formal psychiatric and sociological recognition of black
rage only confirms what black writers have been expressing for
years. In novels like Richard Wright's Native Son2' and plays like
LeRoiJones's Dutchman,9 black literature has dramatically depicted
the phenomenon. For example, frustrated by the attractive but off-
limits white world of urban Chicago, Native Son's Bigger Thomas
describes his pent-up feelings:
Every time I think about [the disparity between blacks and whites]
I feel like somebody's poking a red-hot iron down my throat....
We live here and they live there. We black and they white. They
got things and we ain't. They do things and we can't. It'sjust like
living in jail.
•.. Sometimes I feel like something awful's going to happen
to me.... Naw; it ain't like something going to happen to me....
It's like I was going to do something I can't help. 0
"socially acceptable, useful energy").
I Francine L. Pope, The Disillusioned Black Middle Class, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1,
1994, at 56 (reviewing ELLiS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993)); see also
Law & Order, supra note 11 ("[The successful black man] is just as angry and just as
likely to explode [as any other black man].").
" Pope, supra note 26, at 56; see also Cose, supra note 23, at F1.
28 RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940) (depicting a black male protagonist who
explodes in a violent rage, kills two women, and ultimately dies in the electric chair).
2 LEROIJONES, DUTCHMAN, reprinted in LEROIJONES, DUTCHMAN AND THE SLAVE
3 (1964) (depicting a black male protagonist who vents his rage in a New York City
subway car).
'o WRIGHT, supra note 28, at 23-24. In the author's introduction, Wright explains
the reasons for Bigger's condition: "[G]ranting the emotional state, the tensity, the
fear, the hate, the impatience, the sense of exclusion, the ache for violent action, the
emotional and cultural hunger, Bigger Thomas, conditioned as his organism is, will
not become an ardent, or even a lukewarm, supporter of the status quo." Id. at xx.
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Similarly, after being called "Uncle Tom Big Lip," Dutchman's Clay
Williams reveals his more middle-class rage:
If I'm a middle-class fake white man.... Let me be who I feel like
being. Uncle Tom. Thomas. Whoever. It's none of your
business. You don't know anything except what's there for you to
see. An act. Lies. Device.... And I sit here, in this buttoned-up
suit, to keep myself from cutting all your throats31
Like the psychiatrists and sociologists, literature often locates the
cause of black rage in white discrimination and oppression:
The white neighbor decided to limit the amount of education his
black neighbor could receive; decided to keep him off the police
force and out of the local national guards; to segregate him
residentially; to Jim Crow him in public places; to restrict his
participation in the professions and jobs; and to build up a vast,
dense ideology of racial superiority that would justify any act of
violence taken against him to defend white dominance; and
further, to condition him to hope for little and to receive that little
without rebelling ....
... [This] oppression spawned among [blacks] a myriad variety
of reactions, reaching from outright blind rebellion to a sweet,
other-worldly submissiveness.
3 2
B. Fitting Black Rage into the Criminal Law
In fitting black rage into the criminal law, one must consider the
philosophies driving traditional notions of crime and punishment
and the resulting rationales for exculpating certain actors. This
Section meets both challenges, setting the stage for a discussion of
specific roles available in the criminal law for a black rage defense.
" JONES, supra note 29, sc. 2, at 34.
12 WRIGHT, supra note 28, at xii. Among the myriad variety of reactions to
oppression, Wright includes turning to religion, to alcohol, to education, and to
music. See id. at xii-xiii.
As for turning to music, see JONES, supra note 29, sc. 2, at 35 ("All the hip
white boys scream for Bird [jazz saxophonist Charlie Parker]. And Bird saying, 'Up
your ass, feeble-minded ofay! Up your ass.'... Bird would've played not a note of
music if he just walked up to East Sixty-seventh Street and killed the first ten white
people he saw."); WYNTON MARSALUS, The New Orleans Function: Premature Autopsies
(Sermon), on THE MAJESTY OF THE BLUES (Columbia Records 1989) ("[W]hen a
majestic sound takes the field,... ears begin to change and lives begin to change and
those who were musically lame begin to walk with a charismatic sophistication to their
steps.").
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1. Utilitarianism, Retributivism, and Free Will
Utilitarianism and retributivism constitute the two major penal
theories driving traditional notions of crime and punishment.33
Under the utilitarian theory, the "purpose of all laws is to maximize
the net happiness of society."34 Accordingly, utilitarians justify
punishment only insofar as "it promises to exclude some greater
evil." 5 Thus, in application, utilitarians believe in general deter-
rence-punishing wrongdoers so that other potential wrongdoers
will forego future criminal conduct; specific deterrence-punishing
wrongdoers so that they will forego future criminal conduct; and
rehabilitation-reforming wrongdoers so that they will forego future
criminal conduct."
Retributivism, in contrast, focuses on the notions ofjust deserts
and moral blameworthiness." Under the retributive theory, "pun-
ishment of a wrongdoer is justified because the offender deserves
to be punished ... because he committed a crime."" Thus, unlike
utilitarians who look ahead to future criminal conduct, retributivists
look back to the specifics of the crime committed, gauge the moral
blame associated with that crime, and punish the deserving criminal
actor accordingly-unconcerned with any net societal gain."
" See generally DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 3-12 (discussing the premises behind
and manifestations of these theories); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 136-65 (5th ed. 1989)
(excerpting various utilitarian and retributivist theorists). Denunciation and
incapacitation are other, less influential penal theories. See DRESSLER, supra note 16,
at 8 (discussing denunciation-a theory "that punishment is justified as a means of
expressingsociety's condemnation of a crime"); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra, at 160-
65 (discussing incapacitation-a theory that punishment is justified as a means of
insulating society from a criminal actor).
34 DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 4; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE UTILITARIANS 162 (1961) ("The general
object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total
happiness of the community .... ").
" BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 162; see also DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 5
("[Utilitariansjustify punishment] if, but only if, the pain suffered by [those punished]
will be less than the pain to be experienced by society due to the commission of
future crimes that is avoided as the result of the punishment.").
56 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 5-6 (considering the many forms of utilitarian
theory).
7 See generally id. at 6-8 (discussing the premises and forms of retributivist theory);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 99-107 (John Ladd trans.,
1965) (setting forth Kant's "right to punish," the leading exposition of retributivism).
's DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 6; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
236 (1984) ("[R]etributivism asserts that punishment is properly inflicted because, and
only because, the person deserves it.").
9 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 7 (evaluating "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
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Essential to both penal theories is a belief in the existence of
free will.4" Without free will, the deterrent effect of utilitarianism
breaks down because actors can no longer choose to forego criminal
conduct in order to avoid criminal punishment."' Likewise for
retributivism, without free will, the rationale for punishment
disappears-a criminal actor cannot, and should not, take moral
blame for actions over which he has no control.
4 2
2. Justification and Excuse
The utilitarian and retributivist notions that justify the punish-
ment of certain actors imply that certain otherwise punishable
criminal conduct should go without punishment. These exculpatory
circumstances constitute the criminal law's true defenses: defenses
that, if proven, produce an acquittal even though the prosecution
has proven every element of its prima facie case.4 3  Of the true
defenses, the two categories into which black rage may potentially
fit are justifications and excuses.
44
Justifications are special circumstances which entitle one to act
in a way normally considered wrong and criminal.45 For example,
an actor is entitled to use self-defense when faced with a threat of
unlawful force, necessitating an immediate use of force to protect
himself against the aggressor.46 Similarly, an actor is entitled to
engage in what is normally criminal conduct if the injury that might
reasonably result from such conduct is less than the threatened
tooth" and other articulations of retributivism).
See id. at 5 (noting the utilitarian belief that human beings act rationally and
hedonistically and "will avoid criminal activity if the perceived potential pain
(punishment) outweighs the potential pleasure (criminal rewards)"); id. at 6 ("Critical
to retributive theory is the fact that human beings possess free will-i.e., their conduct
is not determined by factors external to their will.").
"' See BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 162 ("[P]unishment ought not to be inflicted...
[w]here it must be inefficacious: where it cannot act so as to prevent the mischief.").
42 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 6 ("[Under retributivism, p]unishment is
deserved because the wrongdoer made the choice to commit the offense.").
43 See id. at 176 (describing "true defenses"). True defenses differ from case-in-
chief "defenses" which negate the prosecution's prima facie case and thus are
technically not defenses at all. See id. at 175-76.
44 The other two categories of true defenses are crime-specific defenses, such as
legal impossibility and abandonment of criminal enterprise, and extrinsic policy-
driven defenses, such as statutes of limitations and diplomatic immunity. See id. at
177-78 (discussing these defenses); see also Moore, supra note 16, at 1097 (same).
45 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 176-77 (describing justification defenses);
Moore, supra note 16, at 1096 (same).
46 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962) (self-defense provision).
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public or private injury avoided.47 Thus justified, an actor is
neither wrong nor criminal; he acts in a socially acceptable way and
confers upon society a net benefit." As a result, the justified actor
merits neither punishment from the utilitarian in that the actor has
maximized societal happiness and prevented a greater evil,49 nor
punishment from the retributivist in that the actor has acted morally
and blamelessly."
Excuses, in contrast to justifications, deal with wrongful, unjusti-
fied actions that cause a net social harm for which the actor is
nevertheless held not accountable." These excused actors escape
liability because of their subjective mental states: they act out of
mistake,5 2 out of compulsion,53 or otherwise without the requisite
"moral blameworthiness" usually associated with wrongdoers.5 4
Accordingly, both the utilitarian and the retributivist exculpate the
excused actor: mistakes, compulsions, and mental defects both
make deterrents ineffective and mitigate moral blameworthiness.
55
Because conduct driven by black rage will generally fall short of
the net societal betterment required by the justification defenses-
indeed, there is rarely societal benefit gleaned from rages-one
cannot categorize the black rage defense as a justification.56 If a
4 See, e.g., § 3.02(1) (necessity provision).
4 8 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 176-77 (considering the merits ofjustification);
Delgado, supra note 24, at 15 ("Justification defenses hold the defendant accountable
because by acting unlawfully, he or she furthered an important social interest.");
Moore, supra note 16, at 1096 ("Justifications answer the general evaluative question
of whether, all things considered, the world is better or worse than it was without the
action in question.").
49 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarian weighing of
net societal good).
o In fact, because justified actors act morally and blamelessly and confer upon
society a net benefit, society not only refuses to punish them, but also encourages
their actions. See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 177, 180 (commenting on society's
treatment ofjustified actors).
51 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 183 (noting that most societal explanations for
excuses are couched in non-utilitarian terms); Delgado, supra note 24, at 16 ("With
excuses.., the defendant is excused because, as a result of circumstances beyond his
or her control, it is not fair to hold the actor responsible for the criminal act.");
Moore, supra note 16, at 1096 ("[Excuses answer the question of whether there is] a
culpable actor who is responsible for making the world worse than it was without the
act....").
52 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (mistake provision).
5 See, e.g., § 2.09 (duress provision).
5 DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 177; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (insanity
provision).
' See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting that utilitarians do not
favor punishment where it would be an ineffective deterrent).
' To be sure, if black rage-driven criminal conduct miraculously put an end to all
1995] 2261
2262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2251
black rage actor can demonstrate that his rage supplanted or
lessened his moral blameworthiness, however, his act may fit neatly
into the category of excuse defenses.
57
II. ANALYSIS UNDER THE EXISTING LAW58
Since black rage is not a justification, one must turn to the
specific excuse defenses in the criminal law to determine the
racism, one could persuasively argue that the rage conferred a net societal better-
ment. This necessity argument, however, turns on the reasonableness of the actor's
ex ante belief that the harm sought to be avoided can actually be avoided by his
proposed criminal conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (stating the necessity
provision). Because this belief is aspirational, but not reasonable, such a necessity
defense would fail at least the Model Penal Code formulation ofjustification.
" In addition to an excuse role, black rage may play two other roles in criminal
law. First, the special circumstances surroundingblack rage may appropriately figure
into a sentencing calculus wholly independent of a determination of guilt or
innocence. See DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 10, at 6 ("A history of abuse is not a
psychological or a legal license to kill. It may, in some instances, be relevant at
sentencing, but certainly not always."). Or second, quite apart from any underlying
criminal law, the jury may "exercise its constitutionally mandated power to nullify
existing law" by ignoring the judge's instructions and returning a not-guilty verdict
for a guilty defendant. Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Juy Nullification andJuy.
Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 827 (1990) (arguing that a defendant has
a Sixth Amendment right to appeal to ajury in order to nullify existing law); see also
Robert G. Morvillo, Juy Nullification, N.Y. L.J., June 7, 1994, at 3 (analyzing black
rage as ajury nullification "defense"). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, ConsideringJury
'Nullfication".• When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to DoJustice, 30 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 239 (1993) (examining the role ofjury nullification in criminal trials).
Because these roles are not traditional criminal law defenses, they are outside the
scope of this Comment. They remain, however, viable alternatives to traditional
defenses for the use of black rage in the criminal law.
- Because black rage is a recently identified mental condition, resting in part on
psychiatry and in part on sociology, admissibility obstacles could prove troublesome.
See FED. R. EVID. 702 (governing expert testimony in federal courts); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993) (setting the current,
flexible standard for the admission of expert testimony in federal courts); Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (setting the older, stricter federal standard
still followed in some jurisdictions). This question, though, is outside of the scope
of this Comment and has been answered-in the affirmative-by existing analyses of
post-traumatic stress disorder and the like. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and
Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19 (1987) (setting forth a new "four factor
balancing test" for the admissibility of nontraditional evidence); MichaelJ. Davidson,
Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial Defense for Veterans of a Controver-
sial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 434-37 (1988) (assessing evidentiary concerns
surrounding post-traumatic stress disorder); Massucci & Pitaro,supra note 17, at 322-
26 (assessing the evidentiary concerns of the battered person's syndrome); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. .. ").
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possible applications of a black rage excuse defense. Two particular
excuses, insanity and diminished capacity, hold the most promise
for a successful black rage defense.59
Both insanity and diminished capacity operate by demonstrating
a less than usual sense of moral blameworthiness-and thus legal
responsibility-resulting from a mental illness or deficiency that
seriously interferes with free will.' The insane actor, his free will
largely undermined by the operation of a mental disease or defect,
acts without moral blameworthiness and is therefore completely
exonerated.6 t In contrast, the diminished capacity actor, his free
will affected but not fully eclipsed, acts with less than usual moral
blameworthiness and accordingly may deserve partial exonera-
tion.62 Black rage, entailing lost control of behavior and impaired
ability to reason, contains elements of both excuse defenses.
Accordingly, the remainder of this Comment focuses on these two
defenses: first analyzing black rage under existing insanity and
diminished capacity laws and second determining whether these
results are consistent with the policies and theories underlying the
criminal law.
A. The Black Rage Defense as an Insanity Defense
Of the two excuse roles discussed above, the completely
exculpating insanity role presents itself to the black rage defendant
as the more attractive alternative. Accordingly, this Section focuses
on black rage as an insanity defense, first explaining and applying
the several insanity tests to determine whether black rage can
qualify as legal insanity. The Section then proceeds to compare
black rage to other recognized varieties of legal insanity, demon-
strating that black rage is a similar mental condition and thus
deserves similar treatment under the criminal law.
" Other excuse defenses, such as duress and intoxication, have little if any
application to black rage and thus are not discussed in this Comment. For a discus-
sion of these defenses, see DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 259-88.
' Seesupra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing moral blameworthiness
and its relationship to free will).
See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 295-96 (discussing the rationales behind the
insanity defenses); infra part II.A.1 (delineating the insanity tests).
6
2 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 325-27; infra part II.B (discussing diminished
capacity). The diminished capacity defense is only available in some states, and even
then only as a partial defense to a murder charge. See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at
325 (discussing the limitations placed on diminished capacity); infra notes 156-62 and
accompanying text (same).
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1. Explanation and Application of the Insanity Tests
Each of the insanity tests requires that the actor suffer from a
mental disease or defect impairing his ability to act rationally or
control his behavior.6" Consequently, a legal determination of
insanity-a legal term of art-necessarily relies to some extent on
psychiatry.' In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders,'5 the American Psychiatric Association charac-
terizes a mental disorder as "a behavioral or psychological syndrome
or pattern in an individual which usually includes either a painful
symptom or impairment in important areas of functioning."' In
adapting this and similar medical definitions to the law of insanity,
some courts, legislatures, and other institutions have variously
defined the legal requirements of insanity: vaguely, as a "disease of
the mind"; 7 more specifically, as "any abnormal condition of the
mind which substantially ... impairs behavior controls";68 or not
at all.
6 9
Before reaching the merits of the several insanity tests, black
rage must first meet the threshold "disease of the mind" require-
ment, for which "usually only a limited number of psychoses and the
most extreme forms of mental defect can qualify."7 ' This presents
an initial problem for black rage in that it is not listed in the
63 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 298 (explaining the legal definition of mental
disease or defect).
" See id. at 297-98 (noting that "mental illness" is a term used by the psychiatric
community, whereas "insanity" is a legal term).
6 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
6 DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 298 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5 (3d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter DSM-III]).
67 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,722 (H.L. 1843) (establishing the M'Naghten
test discussed infra part II.A.1.a); see also ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 47-49 (1967) (complaining that there has been almost no judicial elaboration
of the term "mental disease").
" McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
69 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 explanatory note (1962) (leaving the issue
of insanity "open to accommodate developing medical understanding"). Arguably,
having no definition of the requirements of legal insanity is as unhelpful as having a
vague definition. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, at 47-48 (noting that this "definition" of disease of
the mind comes not from the disease of the mind prong but from the more detailed
knowledge prong); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTt,JR., CRIMINAL LAW
312 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that only a few psychoses qualify "not because certain
illnesses or defects are per se excluded but rather because they do not produce the
lack of cognition required").
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-the
resource on which courts and psychiatrists heavily rely in determin-
ing legal insanity. However, this problem can be overcome in
appropriate cases through qualified expert testimony, either by
likening black rage to other varieties of insanity71 or by measuring
a particular case of black rage against a definable set of black rage
characteristics, perhaps to be developed by psychiatrists at some
point in the near future.72
7' See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1153-56 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(acknowledging psychiatric testimony diagnosing a case of black rage as schizo-
phrenia-a psychosis); United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957-58 (D.C. Cir.)
(recounting psychiatric testimony diagnosing black rage as akin to emotional illness),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972); Sherman, supra note 2, at A6 (noting an 1846 New
York case as perhaps the first to hold a black rage defendant insane).
In Robertson, the defendant-a black man-became involved in a pool hall fight,
returned there a half-hour later, and shot and injured one white man. Robertson
then jumped into his car and drove erratically through downtown Washington,
causing a multiple-car accident. Following this accident, Robertson shot and killed
another white man who was standing motionless by the parked car Robertson hadjust
hit. See Robertson, 507 F.2d at 1150. To his psychiatrist, Robertson explained, "They
have arrested me and by this trial seek my elimination .... If a black man kills a white
man, it is not a crime. It is getting the oppression off his neck. If a black man kills
a black man, it is murder." Id. at 1154. After the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit remanded to hold insanity hearings, Robertson
refused to raise the insanity defense "for personal reasons of a quasi-political nature,"
feeling that such a defense would only denigrate his social protest. United States v.
Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 447-48 (D.D.C. 1977).
In Alexander, the defendants Alexander and Murdock-both black men-were
sitting at the counter of a hamburger shop when five male marines and a woman-all
white and perhaps all loud and drunk-entered. After a staredown between the
defendants and the marines, the marines left the shop followed by the defendants.
Fighting words and racial slurs ensued, escalating until Alexander drew a .38 revolver,
shooting and killing two of the marines. See Alexander, 471 F.2d at 928-29. According
to testimony of a treating psychiatrist, Murdock exhibited paranoid and sociopathic
behavior. See id. at 957-58. The psychiatrist, however, failed to support this
conclusion adequately, compelling the trial court to strike this testimony. See id. at
955. A jury found both Alexander and Murdock guilty and sane, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. See id. at 926,
928.
' The experience of post-traumatic stress disorder is illustrative of this potentiali-
ty. Not listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders until its third
edition, see DSM-III, supra note 66, at 236-39, post-traumatic stress disorder is now
accepted as a mental disease or defect within the meaning of the tests for legal
insanity. See infra part II.A.2.c. Perhaps black rage will find its place in the fifth
edition of the Manual.
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a. The M'Naghten Test
Over the years, several different formulations of the insanity test
have evolved. The first modern formulation, articulated in 1843 by
the English House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case,73 concerns itself
solely with cognitive or mental-as opposed to volitional or willing-
ability:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, [1] as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, [2] if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.
7 4
Thus, in addition to a mental disease requirement, the M'Naghten
test sets forth two largely redundant prongs: an actor must not
know the nature and quality of his act-that is, that he was squeezing
a human being as opposed to a lemon-or, alternatively, must not
know that the act is legally or morally wrong.7' Application of the
M'Naghten test remains far from straightforward, however, because
its component terms-disease of the mind,76  know,7  and
wrongT--are themselves far from straightforward. Although the
M'Naghten test draws much criticism for being too narrow and
" M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
74 Id. at 722.
75 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 299 ("[A]ny person who lacks [knowledge of the
nature and quality of his act] will also 'fail' the right-wrong test, the second portion
of the insanity definition."); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, at 50 ("[lf the accused did not
know the nature and quality of his act, he would have been incapable of knowing it
was wrong.").
76 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that disease of the mind is a
vague definition).
7 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 299 (distinguishing between narrow interpre-
tations of knowledge-ability to describe verbally-and broader interpretations of
knowledge-ability to evaluate in terms of impact on others); GOLDSTEIN, supra note
67, at 49-50 (same); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 70, at 313-14 (same). Most courts
addressing the issue have chosen the broader interpretation. See GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 67, at 49; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 70, at 313.
78 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 299-300 (distinguishing between legal wrongs
and moral wrongs); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, at 51-53 (same); LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 70, at 314-16 (same). Legal wrongs will usually equal moral wrongs, with
the notable exception of actions inspired by deific decrees, which are known to be
legally wrong but by virtue of their source must be morally right. See, e.g., State v.
Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 652 (Wash. 1983) ("'[L]egally, I know, that it is against the
law, but as far as right and wrong in the eye of God, I would say I felt no particular
wrong.'" (quoting defendant Cameron)).
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outdated, it lately has enjoyed a renaissance of popularity precisely
because it is so stringent.79
Under the M'Naghten formulation of the insanity test, black rage
will satisfy the right-wrong prong of M'Naghten if the actor acts in
an altered state of consciousness, for example, believing himself to
be a leader in a racial war.s" Under the influence of such an
altered state, right and wrong become blurred, and thus an actor
may satisfy M'Naghten's second prong. Similarly, if a black rage
defendant acts under a delusion of persecution or grandeur, for
example, believing he is protecting himself from an illegal statewide
conspiracy and thus misinterpreting his own and others' actions, he
will also satisfy M'Naghten's right-wrong prong.
l
b. The Irresistible Impulse Test
A second variation of the insanity test, the irresistible impulse
test, usually appears as a third prong of the traditional M'Naghten
test. This volitional prong broadens M'Naghten by including as
insane actors those who act out of irresistible, uncontrollable
impulses.8 2 According to typical jury instructions, an irresistible
impulse must "completely deprive[] the person of the power of
choice or volition."" Consequently, "[i]f the accused would not
have committed the act had there been a... policeman present, he
cannot be said to have acted under an irresistible impulse." 4 This
prong, adopted in many M'Naghten jurisdictions, draws much
criticism on the ground that psychiatrists-and philosophers-have
79 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 296-97, 300 (attributing much of the renewed
interest in the M'Naghten test toJohn Hinckley's assassination attempt on President
Ronald Reagan and his subsequent acquittal on the grounds of insanity); KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 33, at 997 (same).
' See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957 (D.C. Cir.) ("[Murdock]
was strongly delusional ... preoccupied with ... the idea.., that racial war was
inevitable."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972); United States v. Robertson, 430 F.
Supp. 444, 445 (D.D.C. 1977) ("Robertson considered himself a 'Black Leader' who
did not think it was murder to kill [a white] because [whites were] ... not human.
[Robertson therefore] viewed the shooting of [a white] as an attempt to put an
'underling' in his place.").
81 See, e.g., infra note 119 (discussing Colin Ferguson's delusion of persecution as
evidenced by his personal writings).
I See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 76 So. 2d 841, 844 (Miss.) (rejecting the irresistible
impulse test in favor of the traditional M'Naghten test), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 946
(1955).
" United States v. Kunak, 17 C.M.R. 346, 359 (C.M.A. 1954) (quoting jury
instructions that elaborate slightly on earlier formulations of the test).
' Id. (setting forth this so-called "policeman-at-the-elbow" formulation of the test).
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difficulty discerning between resistible and irresistible criminal
urges.
8 5
The irresistible impulse test affords the black rage defendant a
second, volitional avenue through which to argue his insanity. This
volitional prong lends itself well to black rage in that black rage may
cause impulsive, uncontrollable behavior."6 A black rage defendant
exhibiting such symptomology will satisfy this prong and thus the
third prong addition to the M'Naghten test.
c. The Model Penal Code Test
The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute embraces
a third insanity test that incorporates both the cognitive element of
the M'Naghten test and the volitional element of the irresistible
impulse test. It reads:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of a mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongful-
ness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
87
The first prong-the appreciation of criminality-is a substantial
revision of the M'Naghten test, collapsing its redundant prongs,
substituting the more lenient "appreciate" for the stricter "know,"
and allowing jurisdictions the option to resolve the moral-legal
question by inserting either "criminality" or "wrongfulness."8 8 The
second prong-the conforming of conduct-restates the irresistible
impulse test but avoids the ambiguous word "impulse."8 9 The
Model Penal Code also modifies both of its prongs with "lacks
SeeAMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1982),
reprinted in ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 1, 16 (1984) (criticizing the irresistible
impulse test); Herbert Wechsler &Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide:
I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 754 (1937) (same).
' See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C. Cir.) ("[C]ounsel
argued... [that] the expert testimony showed that at the critical moment Murdock
did not have control of his conduct, and the reason for that lack of control was a
deepseated emotional disorder that was rooted in his 'rotten social background.'"
(quoting defense counsel)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972); GRIER & COBBS, supra
note 4, at 209-10 (comparing the release of black rage to the sudden violent
backswing of a bent sapling).
87 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962) (alteration in original).
' See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguities of the
M'Naghten test).
89See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (clarifying the meaning of
"impulse").
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substantial capacity" and thus departs from both earlier tests in
requiring less than total incapacitation." As a result, the Model
Penal Code test is broader-and some would say more realistic-than
the earlier tests.9"
Because the Model Penal Code test requires only a lack of
"substantial capacity" to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness
of one's conduct or to control one's impulses, more instances of
black rage will qualify as a sufficient mental disease or defect.9 2 As
for the cognitive and volitional prongs, the Model Penal Code test
essentially restates the satisfiable cognitive prong of the M'Naghten
test and the satisfiable volitional prong of the irresistible impulse
test. Accordingly, black rage defendants who meet those two
insanity tests, or who fall just short, should be able to satisfy the
slightly more lenient Model Penal Code test.'-
d. The Product Test
A fourth insanity test focuses on whether an actor's criminal
conduct is a product of a mental disease or defect. Pursuant to
this "product test," an actor is excused as insane if he has a
mental disease or defect that is a but-for cause of the criminal
behavior charged.94 This broad and "dramatic departure" from
90 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 explanatory note ("The standard does not
require a total lack of capacity, only that capacity be insubstantial."); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 302 (noting this important difference from earlier tests).
" About half of the states and all but one of the federal courts of appeals had
adopted the popular Model Penal Code test by 1980. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 33, at 997. With the rising tide of public resentment toward insanity
verdicts in the early 1980s, however, some jurisdictions rethought their insanity
approaches and reverted to tougher M'Naghten-type tests. See DRESSLER, supra note
16, at 297 (noting a toughening of standards in Congress and in California); KADISH
& SCHULHOFER, supra note 33, at 997 (commenting upon this trend); see also supra
note 79 (noting the connection between the public reaction to theJohn F. Hinckley
acquittal and the toughening of insanity standards).
' See supra notes 80,86 and accompanying text (providing examples of black rage
that approach or meet the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse definitions of insanity).
93 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1).
" The product test first appeared in nineteenth-century New Hampshire. See
State v.Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871) (affirming ajury instruction that included the
product test); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 407-08 (1870) (same). It later surfaced in
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (utilizing the product
test and citing Pike andJones), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972). As a result, the test is sometimes referred to as the New Hampshire
test or the Durham test. The product test reigned supreme in the District of
Columbia Circuit until 1972 when it was expressly overruled by United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973,981-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting the Model Penal Code
1995] 2269
2270 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 2251
traditional notions of criminal responsibility excuses actors
who have control over and appreciate the wrongfulness of their
actions but act anyway as a result of a mental condition.95  In
addition to criticism on this ground, the product test faces criticism
in that it relies too heavily on the existence of a mental disease or
defect and, thus, gives too much power to expert psychiatric
witnesses.
96
The product test is more forgiving than the M'Naghten, the
irresistible impulse, and the Model Penal Code tests, both with
respect to the mental disease or defect requirement and with
respect to the cognitive and volitional prongs. Instead of requiring
a "disease of the mind" that only some psychoses and extreme
mental defects can satisfy,97 or a lack of substantial capacity to
understand or control,9" the product test includes "any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls."
9 9
As a result of this lenient definition, more defendants could
successfully assert a black rage defense under this part of the
product test than under other insanity formulations. 00 If these
defendants could additionally show that black rage was a but-for
cause of their criminal conduct, they would also satisfy the second
part of the test and qualify as legally insane.
insanity test in place of the product test).
95 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 304 (noting that, were it not rejected, the
product test "could have served as the intellectual foundation" to expand criminal
law excuses to include conduct caused by any condition beyond an actor's control).
But see Moore, supra note 16, at 1129-31 (countenancing this proposal by distin-
guishing between compulsion, which merits exculpation, and mere causation, which
does not).
96 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 303 (stating that the legal profession criticized
the product test for leaving the definition of mental disease or defect in the hands of
psychiatrists).
' See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the limited range of
conditions that qualify as diseases of the mind for legal insanity).
" See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal Code
test).
99 McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"o See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 958-59 (D.C. Cir.) (noting
that abnormal mental conditions excluded from other insanity tests may qualify under
the applicable product test's more lenient definition), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044
(1972).
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e. The Federal Test
From the United States Congress comes a fifth and final insanity
test, aptly called the "federal test." Under this test, an actor is
legally insane if, at the time of the criminal conduct, he suffered
from a "severe mental disease or defect" and as a result was unable
to appreciate (1) the nature and quality of the conduct or (2) the
wrongfulness of the conduct.' A partial throwback to
M'Naghten, the federal test replaces the Model Penal Code's more
lenient "lack of substantial capacity" with the less forgiving "severe
mental disease or defect" and removes completely the Model Penal
Code's volitional prong.10 2  As a result, incapacitation must be
cognitive and total, as in M'Naghten, in order to exculpate the
accused.
0 3
Unlike the M'Naghten test and like the Model Penal Code test,
however, the federal test requires appreciation rather than know-
ledge of the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the criminal
conduct. 0 4 Thus, in this limited sense, the federal test is slightly
broader than M'Naghten. Because the federal test "is essentially a
restatement of the M'Naghten rule," the two will produce largely
similar results.' Thus, defendants acting in altered states of
consciousness or under delusional beliefs that pass the M'Naghten
right-wrong prong will similarly pass the federal test.1
06
101 See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988); see also United States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320, 322
(7th Cir. 1992) (construing the federal test).
o Se, e.g., United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ('[B]y
purposeful exclusion, Congress rejected the various formulations of defects of volition
which had been stated in other definitions of legal insanity."); see also supra note 90
and accompanying text (discussing the lower "lacks substantial capacity" threshold).
" See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 997 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
conviction under the federal test of a defendant who had some ability to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his actions); cf. supra note 90 and accompanying text (quoting the
Model Penal Code's drafters who stated that their insanity test requires only
"substantial" impairment, not "complete" impairment, of capacity).
' See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the M'Naghten test's strict
knowledge requirement; supra text accompanying note 88 (discussing the Model Penal
Code test's more relaxed appreciation requirement).
105 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 70, at 312 n.6. However, for the few courts that
strictly interpret the M'Naghten "knowledge" wording, the change to "appreciate" will
produce differences and will include more defendants within the ambit of legal
insanity. See supra note 77 (discussing differing interpretations of knowledge in the
M'Naghten test).
"o See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (speculating as to the outcome of
the black rage insanity defense under the M'Naghten test).
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2. Similarity to Other Varieties of Insanity
Because black rage is a new variation of the old insanity theme,
little directly applicable precedent exists upon which one can
conclusively rely to apply the various insanity tests with any degree
of certainty. However, substantial bodies of insanity defense law
that address paranoid schizophrenia, delusional disorder of the
persecutory type, and post-traumatic stress disorder-three mental
conditions similar to black rage-serve as useful, indirectly applica-
ble guides." 7 Analogizing from these established insanity defenses,
this Section makes clear that black rage is sufficiently similar to
other accepted varieties of insanity and suggests that black rage is
itself a legitimate insanity defense. Accordingly, this Section
describes paranoid schizophrenia, delusional disorder of the
persecutory type, and post-traumatic stress disorder, discusses their
success under the several insanity tests, and compares them to the
black rage phenomenon.
a. Paranoid Schizophrenia
Paranoid schizophrenia may provide the basis for a successful
insanity defense. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, paranoid schizophrenia features a
"[p]reoccupation with one or more delusions or frequent auditory
hallucinations.""'8 Delusions are "typically persecutory or grandi-
ose" and, when combined with anger (which is commonly present),
"may predispose the individual to violence.""0 9 Hallucinations
107 Notably absent from these comparisons is the battered person's syndrome (a
combination of the battered woman's syndrome and the abused child syndrome). If
these syndromes were understood as criminal law excuses, on the theory that a woman
or child is battered to the point where he or she misperceives threats and violently
overreacts, the omission would be a serious oversight indeed. However, these
syndromes operate in the criminal law as justifications that draw upon the self-defense
defense, stretching the imminent danger requirement and subjectivizing the
reasonable belief requirement. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense:
Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 397
(1991) (noting data showing that most battered women kill during confrontational
situations); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text (classifying the battered
person's syndrome as a justification and describing its operation). But see State v.
Hoyt, 128 N.W.2d 645,648 (Wis. 1964) (dealing with the battered woman's syndrome
in conjunction with arguments and insults as heat-of-passion manslaughter).
Therefore, the absence of these syndromes in the following discussion is intentional
and acceptable.
108 DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 287.
'o
8 Id. In addition to anger, "anxiety,... aloofness, and argumentativeness" are
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may occur via any sense but are most often auditory, causing the
individual to enter into a dissociative state.110
The paranoid schizophrenic's delusions initially may seem
intelligent or rational: "[I]ndeed, if one assumes the truth of the
delusory belief, the paranoid's desperate measures are intelligible;
some would even say rational. But eventually we come to see that
what governs is the deluded person's deep, persistent, ultimately
quite unfounded ... feelings of fear and enmity.""' When faced
with independent, contradictory, relevant evidence, the paranoid
schizophrenic will persist in his delusions-a key factor distinguish-
ing delusory beliefs from merely false beliefs and paranoid schizo-
phrenic actors from merely mistaken actors.
1 12
The American Psychiatric Association classifies paranoid
schizophrenia as a "psychotic disorder""' that satisfies even the
most stringent of the insanity test's "mental disease or defect"
requirements.11 4  Further, a paranoid schizophrenic's persistent
delusions or hallucinations likely will constitute sufficient interfer-
ence with cognition, volition, or both. 5 Thus, unable to appreci-
ate the nature and quality of criminal actions or to resist acting on
criminal impulses, paranoid schizophrenics will often qualify as
legally insane actors under the different insanity tests.'
1 6
also commonly present in paranoid schizophrenics. Id.
no See id. at 275.
"I HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN F. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 222 (1979) (footnote, internal quotation marks, and emphasis
omitted).
112 See id. (discussing the "immunity of the [paranoid's] beliefs and attitudes" from
contradictory evidence).
"s DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 274. Note, however, that although mere inclusion
in the Manual may qualify a mental condition as a medical mental disorder, it does
not necessarily qualify it as the "mental disease or defect" necessary for legal insanity.
See Ira K. Packer, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Insanity Defense: A Critical
Analysis, lIJ. PSYCHIATRY & L. 125, 126 (1983).
4 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, at 60-61 (noting the quite widespread feeling
among psychiatrists that all psychotics should be regarded as "insane"); Moore, supra
note 16, at 1139 (noting that testifying psychiatrists generally include the extreme
psychoses within the ambit of mental disease or defect).
"' See e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1986) (describing
hallucinations of "voices" that interfered with a schizophrenic defendant's volition and
compelled him to confess); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 651-53 (Wash. 1983)
(describing hallucinations of deific decrees and attacking spirits that interfered with
a schizophrenic defendant's cognition).
"6 See e.g., Cameron, 674 P.2d at 654, 656 (reversing defendant's conviction in
light of excluded expert testimony on his mental condition and remanding to the trial
court for further proceedings).
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Black rage, although not listed in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders, shares several common character-
istics with listed paranoid schizophrenia. Taken to an extreme, a
"'healthy' cultural paranoia" in which "every white man is a
potential enemy unless proved otherwise and every social system is
set against him unless he personally finds out differently" 1 7 is not
unlike a paranoid schizophrenic's persecutory or grandiose
delusions involving "deep, persistent, ultimately quite unfounded
... feelings of fear and enmity.""' Along these lines, two cases,
both in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, have acknowledged psychiatric testimony likening black
rage to schizophrenia." 9 Thus, when acting out of an exaggerated
cultural paranoia, which presumably then becomes an unhealthy
cultural paranoia, the black rage actor is not much different from
the paranoid schizophrenic actor who generally qualifies as legally
insane.
b. Delusional Disorder, Persecutoy Type
Delusional disorder of the persecutory type may also provide the
basis for a successful insanity defense. According to the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, this form of
psychosis features delusory beliefs that one "is being conspired
117 GRIER & COBBS, supra note 4, at 161, 178; see also Adcock, supra note 22, at 7
("'It is fundamentally a mental illness defense .... The insanity was generated by
years of exposure to white racism.'" (quoting Ronald Kuby, one of Ferguson's former
defense attorneys)).
11 FINARETrrE & HASSE, supra note 111, at 222. Recall that these persecutory
delusions, when combined with anger, may drive a paranoid schizophrenic to vio-
lence. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the paranoid schizophre-
nic's tendency towards violence).
19 See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1150, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(remanding for an insanity hearing in light of two psychiatric expert opinions that
defendant suffered from schizophrenic "'delusions of persecution and influence'...
contributing to impulsive and destructive behavior" (quoting one expert)); United
States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923,953 (D.C. Cir.) (accepting, if supported, psychiatric
testimony diagnosing defendant as "alienated and sullen, with 'paranoid and
sociopathic trends almost ingrained and severe enough to be [deemed] ... a
character disorder'"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
As evidenced by the notes in his pockets on the day of the Long Island Railroad
shooting, Colin Ferguson suffered from similar persecutory delusions, believing that
his university, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the state workers'
compensation board, the New York City transit police, the New York City police,
former Governor Mario Cuomo, the state lieutenant governor, the rest of the New
York state government, his landlord, and several black civil rights leaders were all out
to get him. See Papers and Letter of Suspect, supra note 3, at B8.
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against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned or drugged, mali-
ciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of long-
term goals." 120  Overwhelmed with these feelings of injustice,
those afflicted tend to interpret common or random events such as
"small slights" as if they have special significance consistent with the
disorder's persecutory theme. 21  After a point, persons with
delusional disorder of the persecutory type may engender feelings
of resentment and anger and may engage in litigious behavior or
"resort to violence against those they believe are hurting them." 122
The American Psychiatric Association classifies delusional
disorder of the persecutory type a "psychotic disorder"123 which
satisfies even the strictest variation of the "mental disease or defect"
requirement. 1 When acting out of delusory beliefs, for example,
beliefs that one is the target of a government conspiracy, an
afflicted person may not be able to rationally evaluate and appreci-
ate the criminal nature of his actions.1 25 Under these circum-
stances persons suffering from delusional disorder of the persecu-
tory type may qualify as insane under the various insanity tests.
126
Like delusional disorder of the persecutory type, black rage
involves feelings of being cheated, spied on, followed, maligned,
harassed, and obstructed in the pursuit of goals. In the case of
black rage, however, these feelings are often rooted in reality.27
Further, the "small slights" and common or random events that the
delusional disorder sufferer incorporates into his scheme of deluded
beliefs are not unlike the constant flow of subtle stressors that fuel




"2 Id. at 296.
124 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 67, at 60-61 (noting that psychiatrists regard
psychoses as satisfying the mental disease or defect requirement); Moore, supra note
16, at 1139 (same).
12 See, e.g., Dixon v. State, No. CR93-968, 1994 WL 717042, at *4 (Ala. Crim. App.
Dec. 29, 1994) (finding defendant suffering from delusional disorder of the
persecutory type "unable to rationally evaluate and appreciate either her own actions
or those of others"); Madison v. State, 620 So. 2d 62, 66 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)
(recanting expert testimony that defendant suffering from delusional disorder of the
persecutory type could neither appreciate the criminality of his act nor conform his
conduct to the requirements of law).
12 See, e.g., Dixon, 1994 WL 717042, at *9 (finding defendant-sufferer legally
insane).
127 See, e.g., Cose, supra note 23, at F1 (describing how blacks are followed and
harassed rather than helped while shopping); Pope, supra note 26, at 56 (describing
how blacks are cheated through discrimination in the workplace).
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the black rage sufferer's intense distrust in a racist society. 1 8 In
addition, both the delusional disorder sufferer and the black rage
sufferer share another unfortunate trait: the two may respond to
real or perceived wrongs with a violent rage towards those who
symbolize their torment.' 29 In light of these many similarities, the
criminal law should not treat black rage differently than it treats
delusional disorder of the persecutory type: both diseases should
merit inclusion in the family of recognized insanity defenses.
c. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Post-traumatic stress disorder may also provide the basis for a
successful insanity defense. Post-traumatic stress disorder, also
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, features "persistent reexperiencing" of an extremely
traumatic event involving death, injury, or a threat to one's physical
integrity that the suffering individual experienced, witnessed, or
learned about."' 0 Often, the extreme traumatic event or "stressor"
consists of "military combat, violent personal assault ... , being
kidnapped, being taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, incarcera-
tion as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp, natural or
manmade disasters, severe automobile accidents, or being diagnosed
... Compare DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 298 (describing how delusional disorder
sufferers incorporate small slights and everyday events into their schemes of deluded
beliefs) with Alexander, supra note 4, at B5 (terming subtle stressors "micro-insults")
and Cose, supra note 23, at F1 (relating the racial stress that middle-class blacks
experience).
129 According to his former defense attorney, Colin Ferguson was diagnosed as
suffering from delusional disorder of the persecutory type. See Kuby Telephone
Interview, supra note 5; see also Peter Noel, Rage of an Invisible Man: The Trials of
Colin Ferguson, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 21, 1995, at 21, 25 ("[O]n the day the crime was
committed, Colin Ferguson suffered from a 'delusional disorder of the persecutory
type' and 'as a result of this disorder he lacked substantial capacity to understand
what he was doing was wrong.'" (quoting examining psychiatrist Dr. Richard G.
Dudley)). Dr. Dudley elaborated:
As is characteristic of this disorder, Colin Ferguson's behavior has ranged
from the exaggeration of small slights, to litigious behaviors, to verbalized
anger and resentment, to violence .... In addition, his delusional beliefs
have been so strong that he has consistently and repeatedly acted on these
delusional beliefs, despite the fact that his actions might harm himself or
others.
Id.
1" DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 424. If the extreme traumatic event was learned
about, as opposed to experienced or witnessed, the event must have involved the
actual or threatened death, injury, or physical integrity of a family member or other
close associate. See id.
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with a life-threatening illness."' Symptoms include guilt about
surviving traumatic events that others did not; avoidance of
situations or activities that resemble the causal traumatic event;
"impaired affect modulation; self-destructive and impulsive
behavior; dissociative symptoms; ... feelings of ineffectiveness,
shame, despair, or hopelessness; feeling permanently damaged;...
impaired relationships with others; [and] a change from the
individual's previous personality characteristics.
"132
Of those who do develop the disorder, 33 only a small fraction
suffer from the more acute symptoms of impulsive behavior and
dissociation that may cause criminal conduct. 3 4  When such
disorder-prompted criminal conduct does occur, however, the actor
may satisfy the irresistible impulse, the Model Penal Code, or the
product insanity tests by demonstrating an inability to conform his-
perhaps unconscious, perhaps impulsive-conduct to the require-
ments of law." 5 The stricter M'Naghten and federal insanity tests,
requiring that the actor neither understand nor appreciate the
... Id. Because post-traumatic stress disorder frequently affects combat veterans,
it is also known as "shellshock," "battle fatigue," and "Vietnam Stress Syndrome."
Daniel E. Speir, Application and Use of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Defense to
Criminal Conduct, ARMY LAW., June 1989, at 17, 17.
... DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 425; see also Speir, supra note 131, at 18 (discussing
the manifestations of post-traumatic stress disorder). Extreme post-traumatic stress
disorder may cause "flashback" dissociative states in which the sufferer unconsciously
reenacts his traumatic episode. Frequently, for example, Vietnam veterans in such
a state will act believing that they are back in Vietnam shooting at the enemy, when
in reality they are shooting at innocent bystanders or police officers. See id.; see also
Landy F. Sparr et al., Militay Combat Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and Criminal
Behavior in Vietnam Veterans, BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., Mar. 1987, at 141,
151 (discussing a defendant's "altered state of consciousness" resulting from post-
traumatic stress disorder); cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing
dissociative states in paranoid schizophrenics).
1 3 Most people who experience an extremely traumatic event do not develop post-
traumatic stress disorder. See Speir, supra note 131, at 17.
134 See Packer, supra note 113, at 133 ("In rare instances some [post-traumatic
stress disorder sufferers] may experience brief psychotic or dissociative states, during
which they appear to be reliving or reenacting traumatic episodes."); Speir, supra note
131, at 18 ("Fortunately, most manifestations of [post-traumatic stress disorder] do
not result in criminal conduct.").
"' See Speir, supra note 131, at 18 (noting that the post-traumatic stress disorder
defense is most successful in jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Penal Code);
Davidson, supra note 58, at 422-27 (arguing that post-traumatic stress disorder has
passed the irresistible impulse and the Model Penal Code tests in some cases); State
v. Heads, No. 106-126 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 10, 1981) (finding the defendant, an ex-
marine who suffered from combat flashbacks, insane under the irresistible impulse
test); see also supra part II.A.1.b-d (discussing the requirements of the irresistible
impulse, the Model Penal Code, and the product insanity tests).
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wrongfulness of his conduct, are not so easily satisfied.' To
satisfy the M'Naghten right-wrong prong the defendant suffering
from post-traumatic stress disorder must show that he acted in a
true dissociative state-for example believing that he was acting in
justifiable self-defense against a physical assault-or that he was back
in combat conditions where otherwise criminal conduct is often
"right" or "justifiable."
3 7
Post-traumatic stress disorder is particularly vulnerable to
falsification or exaggeration. Although many people experience
traumatic events, post-traumatic stress disorder affects few people
and even fewer people severely. 3 8 The temptation to fabricate
post-traumatic stress disorder is especially great considering the
"ease with which a savvy defendant can fake" the disorder's well-re-
searched symptoms. 3 9  Unless such a duplicitous defendant
frustrates his own plan through indiscretion, 40 the burden rests
with experienced psychiatrists and juries to distinguish the legiti-
mate post-traumatic stress claims from the phony ones.
4 '
" The defendant in these jurisdictions must also prove that he did not
understand the nature and quality of the act. See Speir, supra note 131, at 18; see also
Briggs v. State, 715 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (convicting a post-traumatic
stress disorder defendant whose alleged insanity fell short of the M'Naghten test);
Packer, supra note 113, at 130-33 (describing a case study of a post-traumatic stress
disorder victim who was found to be legally sane due to his goal-oriented, self-serving
behavior during his offense).
-57 See State v. Cocuzza, No. 1484-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 27, 1981) (acquitting
under the M'Naghten test a defendant suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder);
Speir, supra note 131, at 18 (noting that in some instances the defense can meet the
burden of proof under the M'Naghten test and the federal test, although it is difficult);
Davidson, supra note 58, at 422-25, 427-34 (arguing that in some instances post-
traumatic stress disorder has passed the M'Naghten test and would pass the then-new
federal test); see also supra part II.A.l.a, e (discussing the M'Naghten and the federal
insanity tests).
" See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (noting the infrequency of post-
traumatic stress disorder).
159 Speir, supra note 131, at 19 (discussing People v. Lockett, 468 N.Y.S.2d 802,
806 (Sup. Ct. 1983), in which, after the state had accepted a plea bargain, it was
discovered that the defendant claiming post-traumatic stress disorder had served his
entire military stint as a clerk in combat-free Texas); see also Sparr et al., supra note
132, at 153 (noting that post-traumatic stress disorder is a difficult diagnosis to
confirm).
14o See Speir, supra note 131, at 19 (discussing State v. Simonson, 669 P.2d 1092,
1096 (N.M. 1983), in which a defendant frustrated his own plan to fake post-traumatic
stress disorder).
1 See Packer, supra note 113, at 133-34 (placing the burden on the court and on
mental health professionals to document better the rates of successful treatment of
post-traumatic stress disorder sufferers to provide the courts with an improved basis
for determining whether a defendant's claim is true or false); Sparr et al., supra note
BLACKRAGE
Vietnam veterans have been particularly successful at using post-
traumatic stress disorder insanity defenses. 4 2 Realistically, one
must attribute at least some of this success to a deft manipulation
of "the emotional baggage left over from the Vietnam War." 4" To
obtain an acquittal, one attorney recommended "play[ing] off the
collective guilt of the country over Vietnam .... In rural, red-neck
areas, people are patriotic. And in the urban areas, they're guilt-
ridden over the war."
144
Like post-traumatic stress disorder, black rage arises from
mental stresses and can cause depression, grief, impulsive behavior,
resentment, and dissociative symptoms. 45  However, whereas
post-traumatic stress disorder results from one extremely traumatic
stressor, black rage results from a steady flow of extremely subtle
stressors that in and of themselves may seem minor but when taken
as a whole may profoundly affect the psyche.146  In this sense,
black rage may be seen as a kind of gradual post-traumatic stress
without a well-defined burst of trauma.
As with post-traumatic stress disorder, most people that
experience constant racial stress do not develop black rage-
particularly not to the level at which they cannot control themselves
or perceive rationally. 147 However, this raises the same criticism
that plagues post-traumatic stress disorder: black rage's vulnerabili-
ty to falsification or exaggeration. 14 Indeed, although black rage
132, at 154-56 (discussing post-traumatic stress disorder assessment).
142 See supra notes 135, 137 and infra note 144 (citing successful post-traumatic
stress disorder insanity defenses). But see supra note 136 (citing Briggs v. State, 715
S.W.2d 223 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986), in which the defendant mounted an unsuccessful
post-traumatic stress disorder defense).
1 Speir, supra note 131, at 20.
'" Id. (quoting the attorney in United States v. Tindall, No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept.
19, 1980) (involving the acquittal of a Vietnam veteran on criminal charges)).
1 Compare DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 424-29 (discussing the symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder) and Speir, supra note 131, at 18 (same) with GRIER &
COBBS, supra note 4, at 205-06, 209-10 (discussing like symptoms of black rage) and
Adcock, supra note 22, at 7 (same).
148 Compare DSM-IV, supra note 65, at 424 (discussing the traumatic stressors that
may cause post-traumatic stress disorder) with Alexander, supra note 4, at B5 (calling
these subtle stressors "micro insults") and Cose, supra note 23, at F1 (discussing subtle
stressors in the lives of middle-class blacks).
147 Compare Speir, supra note 131, at 17 ("Even though a person may experience
an extremely traumatic event.., there is no reason to assume that he or she will
develop a [post-traumatic stress disorder]; in fact, most people do not.") with
Alexander, supra note 4, at B5 ("Most blacks take a healthy point of view on dealing
with discrimination and racism.").
' See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing the infrequency of
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does not yet command any accepted symptomology, a savvy
defendant could surely take advantage of the existing black rage
literature together with the insanity defense case law in order to try
to fake the defense. 4 9  Nevertheless, protecting against this
danger does not require abolishing the entire concept of a black
rage insanity defense; it merely requires safeguards similar to those
used when a defendant claims post-traumatic stress disorder:
experienced psychiatrists and, as always, wary juries concerned with
making the correct findings of fact. 5
In addition, black rage and post-traumatic stress disorder affect
juries in a similar way. Whereas Vietnam veterans can elicit the
country's emotional baggage of the Vietnam War, blacks in America
can remind juries of hundreds of years of slavery, discrimination,
and racism.' This black rage strategy plays to the white juror's
sense of guilt and to the black juror's sense of solidarity.1
52
Perhaps even more than paranoid schizophrenia and delusional
disorder of the persecutory type, post-traumatic stress disorder
provides an apt analogy for black rage. In their origins, in their
effect on juries, and even in their drawbacks, black rage and post-
traumatic stress disorder share much in common. The criminal law
should respond accordingly, accommodating black rage as it has
post-traumatic stress disorder.
B. Diminished Capacity
The diminished capacity defense contains two mutually exclusive
but nevertheless intertwined strains: a mens rea strain and a partial
responsibility strain. The mens rea strain is technically not a
defense at all; it operates to defeat the prosecution's prima facie
case by showing that the actor, as a result of an abnormal mental
condition short of insanity, did not have the mental capacity to
post-traumatic stress disorder).
149 Cf supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing the temptation to
fake a post-traumatic stress disorder defense). Indeed, many people have accused
Colin Ferguson and his attorneys of faking the black rage defense. See, e.g.,
DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 10, at 89-91, 323 (criticizing Ferguson's former attorney
William Kunstler for "creat[ing]" the defense).
" See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the court
and medical practitioners in preventing fraudulent defenses).
1 See, e.g., GRIER & COBBS, supra note 4, at 181-99 (describing years of
discrimination and oppression); supra note 32 and accompanying text (same).
152 See DERSHowrrz, supra note 10, at 90 (calling black rage strategy "play[ing] the
race card"); cf. Speir, supra note 131, at 20 (surmising that Vietnam Stress Syndrome
appeals to guilt and patriotism).
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formulate the required mens rea component of the crime
charged. 53 In contrast, the partial responsibility component is a
true but partial defense, excusing an actor of some responsibility for
his criminal conduct on account of an abnormal mental condition
short of insanity.154 Whereas the mens rea variant enjoys consid-
erable acceptance,'55 its partial responsibility cousin is far less
popular and is only followed in some states-and there only as a
mitigating defense reducing murder to manslaughter.
5 6
1. Common Law Jurisdictions
Common law jurisdictions that accept the partial responsibility
strain of diminished capacity157 generally limit its application to
circumstances in which a provoked actor kills his provoker in the
sudden heat of passion.'5 8 In these jurisdictions, the actor must
" See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 320 (discussing the underlying nature of the
diminished capacity defense); Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLuM. L. REV. 827,
828, 830 n.17 (1970) (distinguishing the strains but ultimately arguing that the two
are in function "virtually indistinguishable"); StephenJ. Morse, Undiminished Confusion
in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5-9 (1984) (reaffirming
Arenella's distinction and arguing that courts should adopt only the mens rea strain).
'5 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 322-25 (discussing arguments against full
recognition of the defense); Arenella, supra note 153, at 829 (noting that the partial
responsibility strain "opens the courtroom doors to most psychological testimony
concerning the accused's mental disabilities"); Morse, supra note 153, at 20 (arguing
against the adoption of the partial responsibility strain because actors with mental
problems short of insanity should be able to avoid offending the law).
'5 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 320 ("A few states, including those that follow
the Model Penal Code, recognize the defense as appropriate regarding all crimes.
Most states, however, limit the defense to some or all specific-intent offenses. Other
states do not recognize the defense at all."); Arenella, supra note 153, at 829 & n.11
(noting the mens rea strain's acceptance and citing cases in support of that notion).
6 See DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 325 (noting that by 1978 only 15 states had
adopted the partial responsibility version of the diminished capacity defense as
suggested by the Model Penal Code); Morse, supra note 153, at 21 (noting that the
Model Penal Code version has been adopted in a substantial number ofjurisdictions).
Where the partial responsibility strain mitigates a murder charge, the accused will be
guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.3(1)(b) (1962) ("Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when ... a
homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation
or excuse.").
157 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3-(a)(2) (1977) (setting forth a heat of passion
provision); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4b(2) (West 1981) (same).
I's See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 407 P.2d 117, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (finding that
a quarrel provoked by the deceased could have created the requisite heat of passion);
People v. Wickersham, 650 P.2d 311, 327 (Cal. 1982) (noting that the assailant must
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kill before he has an opportunity to reflect on the situation and cool
down. 5 ' Additionally, the provoking event must be such that an
ordinary person of average mind and disposition would be similarly
provoked and inclined to act as the provoked actor did.6 0 Where-
as in some jurisdictions only physical violence and witnessing
adultery meet this latter requirement,161 in other less restrictive
jurisdictions, any conduct or words that might cause a reasonable
person to lose self-control may warrant ajury instruction.
162
While the anger inherent in black rage would qualify as passion
under the common law formulation of heat of passion mitiga-
tion,6 3 black rage would likely fall short of other common law
requirements. Because black rage results from a simmering
resentment built up over a long period of time, 164 there may not
act "under the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion"); People v. Borchers,
325 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1958) (defining passion as any "violent, intense, high-wrought,
or enthusiastic emotion").
159 See, e.g., State v. Yanz, 50 A. 37, 38 (Conn. 1901) (requiring that the homicidal
act occur "in the first transport of passion"); State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 9 (Wash.
1915) (refusing a jury instruction on diminished capacity where the court found
sufficient cooling-off time had elapsed). But see People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 778
(Cal. 1976) (permitting the jury to determine reasonable cooling-off time in an
extreme case).
"6 See, e.g., Addington v. United States, 165 U.S. 184, 186 (1897) (holding
adequate a provocation that "would render any ordinary prudent person for the time
being incapable of that cool reflection that otherwise makes it murder"); People v.
Webb, 300 P.2d 130, 139 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (holding adequate a provocation
that would be such as "tend to arouse the passion of an ordinarily reasonable man").
"61 See Stewart v. State, 78 Ala. 436 (1885) (holding that a blow in the face
intentionally inflicted on the defendant by the deceased might constitute adequate
provocation); Jones v. People, 47 P. 275, 277 (Colo. 1896) (holding adequate the
witnessing of adultery); Yanz, 50 A. at 38 (same); cf. People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1,
15 (Cal. 1946) (holding inadequate words, no matter how insulting).
162 See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212,222 (1862) ("[hf the alleged provocation be
such as to admit of any reasonable doubt, whether it might not have had such
tendency, it is much safer ... and more in accordance with principle, to let the
evidence go to the jury under the proper instructions."). Most common lawjurisdic-
tions prefer the Maherposition to the restrictive position. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER,
supra note 33, at 442 ("The restrictive view has now given way, in mostjurisdictions,
to the position adopted by the majority in Maher.... ."). But see, e.g., Aguilar v. State,
242 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Ga. 1978) (adhering to the restrictive position and holding that
the trial court did not invade the province of the jury when it charged that
provocation by words is always inadequate to reduce murder to manslaughter); State
v. Guebara, 696 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan. 1985) (same); Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 380
N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 1978) (same); State v. Madden, 294 A.2d 609, 620 (N.J. 1972)
(same).
" See supra note 158 and accompanying text (describing passion as including
violent, intense emotions).
164 See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text (setting forth the psychiatric and
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be any specific provocation that would qualify as legally ade-
quate. 165  Furthermore, since a person venting his black rage
strikes not at the causes of the rage but rather at the symbols of the
rage, he usually kills innocent bystanders rather than provokers.
The defendant thereby disqualifies himself from the common law
provocation partial defense."'
2. Model Penal Code Jurisdictions
Model Penal Code jurisdictions167 take a broader approach to
sociological basis for black rage).
" See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (discussing the common law
adequacy requirement). Even if there were a specific provocation-such as words-
involved in black rage situations, it would still be inadequate in the common law
jurisdictions requiring provocation more severe than offensive words or situations.
Seesupra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (discussing the more and less restrictive
adequacy requirements).
" See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the common law
requirement that an actor kill his provoker).
16 Hawaii and Montana have adopted the Model Penal Code extreme mental or
emotional disturbance provision verbatim. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-702 (1985 &
Supp. 1992) (reducing murder to manslaughter where defendant was "under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (1993) (defining the affirmative defense
of "extreme mental or emotional stress" as requiring a "reasonable explanation or
excuse"). New Hampshire and Utah have adopted the provision without its subjective
reasonableness standard. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:2 (1986 & Supp. 1993)
(stating that a person is guilty of manslaughter if he was "[u]nder the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (1992 &
Supp. 1994) ("The reasonableness of an explanation.., shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person...."). Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky,
New York, North Dakota, and Oregon have adopted an extreme emotional
disturbance provision, omitting the word "mental." See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104
(Michie 1987) (allowinga defense of "extreme emotional disturbance for which there
is a reasonable excuse," as viewed from the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a(a) (West 1994) ("[I]t shall be an
affirmative defense that the defendant [acted] ... under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation ... to be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be .... ."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 641 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (requiring that the defendant prove his extreme emotional
distress); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994)
(stating that extreme emotional disturbance must be established by a reasonable
explanation determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) (stating that committing
a crime "under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a
mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
16-01(2) (1985 & Supp. 1993) (mitigating a homicide caused "under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse" from a class AA
felony to a class A felony); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(1)(a) (1990 & Supp. 1994)
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the partial responsibility strain of diminished capacity, merely
requiring that an actor kill under the influence of an "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance. " "6  This disturbance must be
such that "there is [a] reasonable explanation or excuse... [to] be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation
under the circumstances as he believes them to be."
169 To fall
within the scope of this definition, a defendant must typically show
that he:
(a) has no mental disease or defect that rises to the level [of legal
insanity]; and
(b) is exposed to an extremely unusual and overwhelming stress;
and
(c) has an extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which
there is a loss of self-control and reason is overborne by
intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief,
excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.
70
The extreme mental or emotional disturbance formulation
incorporates two distinct prongs: a common law provocation prong
(emotional disturbance), and a partial insanity prong (mental
disturbance).,7 The former prong operates much like common
law provocation but without its stringent per se requirements.
Thus, under the Model Penal Code, there need not be a well-
defined triggering event provoking the actor;' 72 nor need the
(providing an affirmative defense if the defendant "was under the influence of an
extreme emotional disturbance").
'68 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962). As to the independent significance
of the word "extreme," see Richard Singer, The Resurgence ofMens Rea: I-Provocation,
Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 303 (1986)
("[T]he phrase 'emotional and mental disturbance' is to be read as a single term of
art, rather than parsed.").
'69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b). The drafters of the Model Penal Code
explain in their commentaries, "In the end, the question is whether the actor's loss
of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy in the ordinary
citizen. Section 210.3... leaves the ultimate judgment to the ordinary citizen in the
function of ajuror assigned to resolve the specific case." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3
cmt.; cf. supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness
inquiry of the common law approach to the provocation mitigation).
170 People v. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 717-18 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (setting forth the
leading definition of extreme emotional disturbance); see also State v. Elliott, 411 A.2d
3, 8 (Conn. 1979) (following the Shelton definition); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649,
659 (N.D. 1982) (same); State v. Carson, 640 P.2d 586, 590 (Or. 1982) (same).
171 But see supra note 167 (noting that seven Model Penal Code jurisdictions have
explicitly omitted the word "mental," and thus the mental prong, from the provision).
1 See, e.g., Elliot, 411 A.2d at 7 ("[T]he defense [of extreme emotional distur-
bance] does not require a provoking or triggering event .... ."); People v. Casassa,
404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980) ("[I]t may be that a significant mental trauma has
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actor kill the individual that causes his mental or emotional
disturbance. 7 Accordingly, the pitfalls encountered under the
common law formulation would not hinder a black rage extreme
emotional disturbance defense, rendering a defendant's crime
eligible for mitigation.
174
The latter, partial insanity prong offers the black rage defendant
an additional avenue through which to argue for diminished
capacity mitigation. 175  Because extreme mental disturbance
constitutes a lower legal hurdle than does legal insanity, instances
of black rage will more readily qualify under the partial insanity
prong of the Model Penal Code. Consequently, a black rage
defendant who, through expert testimony, can convince a jury that
there is a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for his mental
condition' 76 will merit partial exoneration, thereby reducing his
conviction from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LAW
Although the preceding analysis demonstrates that black rage
neatly fits into both the insanity defense 17 7 and the Model Penal
Code formulation of the diminished capacity partial defense,
17
these results prove troubling for the utilitarian and retributivist
penal schemes underlying the criminal law.17 In addressing these
concerns, this Part examines the results of the preceding analysis
through utilitarian and retributivist lenses, ultimately concluding
affected a defendant's mind for a substantial period of time, simmering in the
unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming to the fore." (quoting People
v. Patterson, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 582 (1976))).
173 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt; State v. Zdanis, 438 A.2d 696, 700
(Conn. 1980) (hinting that on different facts the court would uphold a manslaughter
verdict where the defendant killed a non-provoker).
"74 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
inherent in a common law black rage provocation defense).
1"5 Of course, this avenue is only open in Model Penal Codejurisdictions retaining
the original wording of the provision. See supra note 167 (noting that only some of
the Model Penal Code jurisdictions have retained the wording of the model
provision).
176 See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable explana-
tion or excuse requirement of the Model Penal Code formulation of diminished
capacity).
' See supra part II.A (discussing the black rage insanity defense).
178 See supra part II.B (discussing the black rage diminished capacity defense).
17 See supra part I.B.1 (discussing the utilitarian and retributivist approaches to
punishment theory).
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that black rage diminished capacity rather than black rage insanity
is the better role for the black rage defense in the criminal law.
A. Insanity and Culpable Coping Mechanisms
While those afflicted with black rage may qualify as legally
insane in that they act without the deterrability and sense of moral
blameworthiness necessary to inflict punishment under the
utilitarian and retributivist penal schemes, black rage actors should
not be permitted to externalize the entirety of moral and legal
responsibility onto society. Although society, through its pervasive
and persistent racism, has laid the foundation for the destructive
coping mechanisms that lead to black rage, the potential black rage
sufferer chooses to resort to those mechanisms rather than to
pursue more rational, constructive ones.
180
In that the choice to deal destructively with racial stress is one
born of free will, the black rage actor is both deterrable and morally
blameworthy. Accordingly, under the utilitarian and retributivist
penal theories, the criminal law should hold him at least partially
responsible for his resulting criminal actions. In similar contexts
involving involuntary movements, courts have expressed a willing-
" See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1615
(1994) ("[A]n excuse will not obtain if the agent was responsible either for placing
herself in the situation or for failing to employ possible, resistant strategies. An agent
who causes or fails to prevent the circumstances of her own excuse should not profit
thereby."); id. (noting that "avoidance and resistance strategies are often genuinely
possible" in a mental abnormality context). See generally Moore, supra note 16, at
1130 (positing that all human actions are caused but arguing that only those causes
which are compelled warrant a criminal law excuse: "compulsion requires an agent
who reasons about what to do but whose opportunity or capacity to follow the normal
dictates of that reason is interfered with either by external factors (threats, natural
necessity) or internal factors (extreme emotion or cravings)"); StephenJ. Morse, The
Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1252
(1976) ("[A person's] environment is not all-determinative: it interacts with
intrapersonal factors.").
Indeed, most blacks faced with persistent racial stress deal with it constructively
rather than destructively. See e.g., COMER & POUSSAINT, supra note 25, at 64
(suggesting that black parents help their children deal with racism constructively);
WRIcHT, supra note 28, at xii-xiii (noting that some blacks deal with racial stress
constructively by turning to religion, education, or music); Alexander, supra note 4,
at B5 ("Most blacks take a healthy point of view on dealing with discrimination and
racism .. . ."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (providing a legal means of
dealing with denials of "equal protection of the laws"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)
(creating a civil cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (providing a legal means of
dealing with discrimination regarding "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
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ness to look back in time to find voluntary, deterrable, and morally
culpable acts."' Thus, holding a black rage actor criminally
responsible despite his mental illness produces a result consistent
with utilitarianism, retributivism, and criminal law precedent.
1 8 2
B. Diminished Capacity and Shared Blame
The rationale behind the diminished capacity defense suggests
that it is the most appropriate role for the black rage defense in the
criminal law. As a mitigating partial excuse, diminished capacity
apportions blame between the two causal and blameworthy parties-
the black rage actor and the society that had a hand in creating him.
This blame-sharing solution accomplishes the retributive and
utilitarian goal of punishing deterrable and deserving actors,
183
and also focuses societal attention on the larger social causes of
black rage: pervasive and persistent discrimination and oppression." 4
181 See e.g., State v. Gooze, 81 A.2d 811, 816 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951)
(placing the burden on a known sufferer of Mni~re's Syndrome to foresee the
dangers inherent in operating a motor vehicle and to refrain from such behavior
accordingly); People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803-04 (N.Y. 1956) (placing the
burden on a known epileptic to foresee the dangers inherent in operating a motor
vehicle and to refrain from such behavior accordingly); Norval Morris, Somnambulistic
Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5 RES JUDICATAE 29, 29-30 (1951)
(discussing a case in which the court could have placed a similar burden on a known
somnambulist who killed her daughter while both were asleep); cf. Martin v. State, 17
So. 2d 427,427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944) (acquitting the accused of manifesting a drunken
condition in public because he was "involuntarily and forcibly carried to that place
by the arresting officer"). See generally Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of
One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1985).
182 Furthermore, to the extent that other victimization defenses attempt to eschew
the entirety of criminal responsibility onto society, they too do not merit an insanity
defense. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing examples of victimization
defenses such as child abuse syndrome, rotten social background, and urban survival
syndrome).
8 See supra part III.A (explaining the extent to which black rage actors are
deterrable and morally culpable).
184 See Delgado, supra note 24, at 21 ("As a result of learning about the wretched
conditions in which some of its members live, society would presumably decide to do
something about them.");John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externaliza-
tion of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. LJ. 2045, 2071
(1988) (noting that, following externalization principles, "[n]o longer is an individual
party picked out as the 'cause' of a particular act[,] [r]ather, larger groups,
institutions, and society at large become the responsible causes"). But see
DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 10, at 40 (noting that legally excusing an actor driven to
criminal conduct by a societal problem is "little more than a rhetorical, 'feel-good,'
cheap, short-term nonsolution to [the] complex and pressing societal problem that
deserves real solutions, high priority, and significant allocation of resources").
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Diminished capacity not only reaches a practical compromise
that is tolerable from a theoretical perspective of balancing
individual and societal culpability but also recognizes a principled
difference in the respective effects of external and internal factors.
External forces ranging from racist environments to witnessing
adultery can trigger profound human responses. By reducing the
degree of moral responsibility to below that of a calculating killer
while refusing to exculpate entirely, diminished capacity recognizes
human weakness, holding individuals accountable only for control-
ling their responses to external forces. In this respect, diminished
capacity consigns external forces and internal responsibility each to
the respective role that befits them.
CONCLUSION
In light of the dearth of black rage cases, the viability of a black
rage insanity defense or a black rage diminished capacity defense is
far from certain. Applying the black rage psychiatric and sociologi-
cal studies to the legal definitions of insanity reveals that black rage
may, at least in some instances, pass even the strictest of insanity
tests. The paranoid schizophrenia, the delusional disorder of the
persecutory type, and the post-traumatic stress disorder analogies
further point to this conclusion, implying that black rage is a form
of legal insanity that the criminal law should recognize. Similarly
extrapolating from the existing diminished capacity case law, one
can foresee that black rage diminished capacity would encounter
problems under the common law heat of passion formulation but
would, as a matter of law, reach the jury under the analogous Model
Penal Code provision.
However, insofar as black rage insanity is the product of an
actor's choice to pursue destructive rather than constructive coping
mechanisms as a means of dealing with racial stress, the contraction
of black rage represents a deterrable, blameworthy choice that is
subject to criminal law punishment. Black rage diminished capacity
more accurately balances individual and societal responsibility for
black rage, recognizing that environments replete with racial stress
will interfere with, yet not quite eclipse, one's free will. Thus,
punishing only to the extent that a black rage actor remains legally
and morally responsible, diminished capacity better than insanity
expresses societal empathy, if not remorse, while satisfying the
traditional goals of the criminal law.
